





Poor people need a variety of financial services, not just loans. Like everyone else, the poor need a range of financial services that are convenient, flexible, and affordable. Depending on circumstances, they want not only loans, but also savings, insurance, and cash transfer services.



CGAP's Key Principles of Microfinance

Microfinance is a powerful tool to fight poverty. When poor people have access to financial services, they can earn more, build their assets, and cushion themselves against external shocks. Poor households use microfinance to move from everyday survival to planning for the future: they invest in better nutrition, housing, health, and education.



Microfinance means building financial systems that serve the poor. In most developing countries, poor people are the majority of the population, yet they are the least likely to be served by banks. Microfinance is often seen as a marginal sector—a "development" activity that donors, governments, or social investors might care about, but not as part of the country's mainstream financial system. However, microfinance will reach the maximum number of poor clients only when it is integrated into the financial sector.



CGAP's Key Principles of Microfinance

Microfinance can pay for itself, and must do so if it is to reach very large numbers of poor people. Most poor people cannot get good financial services that meet their needs because there are not enough strong institutions that provide such services. Strong institutions need to charge enough to cover their costs. Cost recovery is not an end in itself. Rather, it is the only way to reach scale and impact beyond the limited levels that donors can fund. A financially sustainable institution can continue and expand its services over the long term. Achieving sustainability means lowering transaction costs, offering services that are more useful to the clients, and finding new ways to reach more of the unbanked poor.



Microfinance is about building permanent local financial institutions. Finance for the poor requires sound domestic financial institutions that provide services on a permanent basis. These institutions need to attract domestic savings, recycle those savings into loans, and provide other services. As local institutions and capital markets mature, there will be less dependence on funding from donors and governments, including government development banks.



CGAP's Key Principles of Microfinance

Microcredit is not always the answer. Microcredit is not the best tool for everyone or every situation. Destitute and hungry people with no income or means of repayment need other kinds of support before they can make good use of loans. In many cases, other tools will alleviate poverty better—for instance, small grants, employment and training programs, or infrastructure improvements. Where possible, such services should be coupled with building savings.



Interest rate ceilings hurt poor people by making it harder for them to get credit. It costs much more to make many small loans than a few large loans. Unless microlenders can charge interest rates that are well above average bank loan rates, they cannot cover their costs. Their growth will be limited by the scarce and uncertain supply soft money from donors or governments. When governments regulate interest rates, they usually set them at levels so low that microcredit cannot cover its costs, so such regulation should be avoided. At the same time, a microlender should not use high interest rates to make borrowers cover the cost of its own inefficiency.



CGAP's Key Principles of Microfinance

The role of government is to enable financial services, not to provide them directly. National governments should set policies that stimulate financial services for poor people at the same time as protecting deposits. Governments need to maintain macroeconomic stability, avoid interest rate caps, and refrain from distorting markets with subsidized, high-default loan programs that cannot be sustained. They should also clamp down on corruption and improve the environment for microbusinesses, including access to markets and infrastructure. In special cases where other funds are unavailable, government funding may be warranted for sound and independent microfinance institutions.



Donor funds should complement private capital, not compete with it. Donors provide grants, loans, and equity for microfinance. Such support should be temporary. It should be used to build the capacity of microfinance providers; to develop supporting infrastructure like rating agencies, credit bureaus, and audit capacity; and to support experimentation. In some cases, serving sparse or difficult-to-reach populations can require longer-term donor support. Donors should try to integrate microfinance with the rest of the financial system. They should use experts with a track record of success when designing and implementing projects. They should set clear performance targets that must be met before funding is continued. Every project should have a realistic plan for reaching a point where the donor's support is no longer needed.



CGAP's Key Principles of Microfinance


The key bottleneck is the shortage of strong institutions and managers. Microfinance is a specialized field that combines banking with social goals. Skills and systems need to be built at all levels: managers and information systems of microfinance institutions, central banks that regulate microfinance, other government agencies, and donors. Public and private investments in microfinance should focus on building this capacity, not just moving money.





Microfinance works best when it measures and discloses—its performance. Accurate, standardized performance information is imperative, both financial information (e.g., interest rates, loan repayment, and cost recovery) and social information (e.g., number of clients reached and their poverty level). Donors, investors, banking supervisors, and customers need this information to judge their cost, risk, and return.

| MIX Global ⁻ | 100 | : Compos | site - | Meth | odolo | ogy |
|--|--------|---|-----------------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| I sample (820 MFIs) | | ranked according to perce sple for Zakoura , ranked | | | | |
| seeds of one to an and a second second | Pillar | Metric | Result (by metric) | Percentile (by metric) | Percentile (by pillar) | Percentile (overall) |
| | | Borrowers | 316,177 | 96.50% | | |
| | | Market Penetration | 5.5% | 98.00% | | |
| creened for | 1 | Growth in Borrowers | 59.4% | 80.50% | - 83.73% | |
| tability (607 MFIs) | | Deposits / Loan Portfolio | 0.0% | 59.90% | | |
| | | Depositors / Borrowers | 0.0% | | | |
| | | Cost per Borrower / GNI per capital | 2.1% | 86.70% | _ | 84.37% |
| nked on 11 variables | 0 | Profit / Loan Portfolio | 4.5% | 54.30% | - 69.38% | |
| er three pillars: | 2 | Portfolio at Risk > 30 days | 0.2% | 67.15% | - 69.3870 | |
| utreach (1) | | Write off ratio | 0.5% | | | |
| ficiency (2) | | Audits on MIX Market | 4 | 100.00% | | |
| ansparency (3) | 3 | Annual reporting on MIX Market | 3 | 100.00% | 100.00% | |

| Rank | MFIName | Country | Overall Percentile | Outreach Percentile | Efficiency Per- |
|------|------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| 1 | Zakoura | Morocco | 84.37% | 83.73% | |
| 2 | Sabaragamuwa | Sri La nka | 83.96% | 75.89% | |
| 3 | AlAmana | Morocco | 83.38% | 84.60% | |
| 4 | GV | India | 82.93% | 71.20% | |
| 5 | ProCredit Bank Serbia | Serbia | 82.43% | 89.60% | |
| 6 | Bandhan | India | 81.14% | 76.95% | |
| 7 | Sarvodaya Nano Finance | India | 80.1 2% | 62.55% | |
| 8 | ESA F | India | 80.04% | 68.53% | |
| 9 | Credi Fe | Ecuador | 79.85% | 73.03% | |
| 10 | JMCC | Jordan | 79.59% | 74.35% | |
| 11 | ProCredit Bank – BIH | Bosnia and Herzegovina | 79.27% | 82.03% | |
| 12 | Spandana | India | 78.54% | 70.08% | |
| 13 | ASA | Bangladesh | 78.42% | 81.46% | |
| 14 | FMFB – Pakistan | Pakistan | 78.21% | 77.55% | |
| 15 | ASC Union | Albania | 78.12% | 62.94% | |
| 16 | A E&I | Cote D'Ivoire | 78.09% | 57.63% | |
| 17 | ProCredit SLV | El Salvador | 78.08% | 77.25% | |
| 18 | AMK | Cambodia | 78.08% | 80.78% | |
| 19 | FBPMC | Morocco | 77.88% | 81.33% | |
| 20 | BANTRA | Peru | 77.87% | 8 2.1 5% | |
| 21 | SHARE | India | 77.73% | 60.60% | |
| 22 | Kashf | Pakistan | 77.60% | 78.41% | |
| 23 | Life Bank | Philippines | 77.47% | 78.13% | |
| 24 | FMM Popayán | Colombia | 77.42% | 75.20% | |
| 25 | MBKVentura | Indonesia | 77.39% | 64.10% | |







| C C La hall 4 A | 8 | | | | | |
|-----------------|------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|-----|
| | 0: Outreach – Bo | | | | | |
| Rank | Rank (05) | MFI Name | Country | Borrowers (nb) | Growth in Borrow | ers |
| 1 | 1 | Grameen Bank | Bangladesh | 6,287,000 | | _ |
| 2 | 2 | A SA | Bangladesh | 5,163,279 | | |
| 3 | 4 | VBSP | Vietnam | 4,695,986 | | _ |
| 4 | 3 | BRAC | Bangladesh | 4,550,855 | | |
| 5 | 5 | BRI | Indonesia | 3,4 55,894 | | - |
| 6 | 9 | Spandana | India | 972,212 | | |
| 7 | 8 | SHARE | India | 826,517 | | _ |
| 8 | 10 | Caja Popular Mexicana | Mexico | 643,659 | | |
| 9 | 11 | Compartamos BCSC | Mexico Colombia | 616,528 611,739 | | - |
| | | | | | | |
| | Top 10 | 27, | .823,669 (Tota) | | 2,782,366 (Average) | |
| | Top 25 | 34, | 408,825 (Tota) | | 1,376,353 (Average) | |
| 1 | Top 50 | 39, | .531,006 (Tota) | | 790,620 (Average) | |
| | Top 100 | 44, | 248,370 (Tota) | | 442,483 (Average) | |
| MIX 2006 | MFI Benchmark | | (Median) | | 10,102 | |
| | | | , | | 10/01 | |

| Rank | Rank (05) | MFI Name | Country | Voluntary Depositors (nb |
|------------|--------------|-----------------------|--------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | 1 | BRI | Indonesia | 30,907,56 |
| 2 | 2 | Grameen Bank | Bangladesh | 6,908,70 |
| 3 | З | A SA | Bangladesh | 6,4 55,97 |
| 4 | n/a | BCSC | Colombia | 1,490,26 |
| 5 | n/a | Caja Popular Mexicana | Mexico | 1,1 23,33 |
| 6 | 6 | Equity Bank | Kenya | 1,014,47 |
| 7 | 9 | Khan Bank | Mongolia | 717,82 |
| 8 | n/a | Caja Libertad | Mexico | 605,69 |
| 9 | 11 | Capitec Bank | South Africa | 583,00 |
| 10 | 7 | TMSS | Bangladesh | 570,00 |
| | | | | |
| | Top 10 | 50,376,831 (Tota) | | 5,037,683 (Average) |
| | Top 25 | 55,090,483 (Tota) | | 2,203,619 (Average) |
| | Top 50 | 58,707,062 (Tota) | | 1,174,141 (Average) |
| | Top 100 | 61,724,468 (Tota) | | 617,244 (Average) |
| MIX 2006 M | FI Benchmark | (Median) | | 0 |

| Rank | Rank (05) | MFIName | Country | Return on Assets |
|----------|-----------------------------------|----------------------|--|------------------|
| 1 | 45 | EVRM | Uzbekistan | |
| 2 | 1 | EB-F | Kenya | |
| З | 14 | MLF ZAR | Tajikistan | |
| 4 | 8 | Daulet | Uzbekistan | |
| 5 | 4 | BWA Kashkadarya | Uzbekistan | |
| 6 | n/a | CCC | Ecuador | |
| 7 | 487 | Fondespoir | Haiti | |
| 8 | 9 | DAYAQ-Credit | Azerbaijan | |
| 9 10 | 12 n/a | Compartamos Ugyon | Mexico Philippines | |
| te: 2007 | VIX Global 100 based on data fi | - | 07."n/a" means that ranking sare not available f | örthat vear. |
| onkinge: | | | | |
| | waila ble at the end of this repo | п. | | |
| | | π. | (herace) | 27.4 |
| | Top 10 | π. | (Average) (Average) | 27.4 |
| | Top 10 Top 25 | π. | (Average) | 22.8 |
| | Top 10 | π. | | |

| Rank | Rank (05) | MFI Name | Country | Loan Portfolio (USD) |
|------------------|-----------|------------------------|------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | 1 | BRI | Indonesia | 3,035,685,376 |
| 2 | 2 | BCSC | Colombia | 1,651,013,632 |
| 3 | 3 | VBSP | Vietnam | 1,149,165,056 |
| 4 | 4 | Caja Popular Mexicana | Mexico | 941,664,640 |
| 5 | 5 | КМВ | Russia | 757,073,536 |
| 6 | 7 | Banco Estado | Chile | 569,777,600 |
| 7 | 8 | Caja Libertad | Mexico | 488,526,624 |
| 8 | 6 | Grameen Bank | Bangladesh | 482,104,480 |
| 9 | 13 | ProCredit Bank Serbia | Serbia | 404,506,016 |
| 10 | 10 | BRAC | Bangladesh | 350,160,800 |
| | | | | |
| K | Top 10 | 982,967,776 (Average) | | 9,829,677,760 (Total) |
| | Top 25 | 544,123,835 (Average) | | 1 3,60 3,095,888 (Tota 🕽 |
| | Top 50 | 330,698,457 (Average) | | 16,534,922,864 (Total) |
| - | Top 100 | 194, 343,067 (Average) | | 19,434,306,736 (Tota) |
| MIX 2006 MFI Ben | chmark | (Median) | | |

| Rank | Rank (05) | MFI Name | Country | Return on Assets (%) |
|-----------------|-----------|-----------------|-------------|----------------------|
| 1 | 45 | EVRM | Uzbekistan | 36.3 |
| 2 | 1 | EB-F | Kenya | 32.4 |
| 3 | 14 | MLFZAR | Tajikistan | 32.3 |
| 4 | 8 | Daulet | Uzbekistan | 28.2 |
| 5 | 4 | BWA Kashkadarya | Uzbekistan | 25.1 |
| 6 | n/a | CCC | Ecuador | 25.0 |
| 7 | 487 | Fondespoir | Haiti | 24.5 |
| 8 | 9 | DAVAQ-C redit | Azerbaijan | 24.0 |
| 9 | 12 | Compartamos | Mexico | 23.2 |
| 10 | n/a | Ugyon | Philippines | 22.7 |
| | | | | |
| | Top 10 | (Average) | | 27.4 |
| 6 | Top 25 | (Average) | | 22.8 |
| | Top 50 | (Average) | | 18.3 |
| 4 | Top 100 | (Average) | | 14.2 |
| MIX 2006 MFI Be | nchmark | (Median) | | 0.9 |

| Rank | Rank (05) | MFIName | Country | Cost per Borrower / GNI per capita (%) | Operating Expense / Loan Portfolio (|
|----------|---------------|---|----------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| 1 | 8 | IWB | India | 0.28 | |
| 2 | 9 | Sanghamithra | India | 0.40 | |
| 3 | n/a | Maha shakti | India | 0.42 | |
| 4 | 15 | KAS | India | 0.44 | |
| 5 | 13 | SKDRDP | India | 0.47 | |
| 6 | n/a | RADE | Egypt | 0.48 | |
| 7 | 21 | Sarvodaya Nano Finance | India | 0.49 | |
| 8 | 4 | SMS | India | 0.52 | |
| 9 10 | 22 | MEI | India | 0.53 | |
| te: 2007 | | SED 00 based on data from MIX Marke he end of this report. | Thailand available on Decembe | 0.59 r 3,2007."n/a" means that ranking sare not av | |
| te: 2007 | MIX Global 10 | 00 based on data from MIX Marke | | | |
| te: 2007 | MIX Global 10 | 00 based on data from MIX Marke | | | |
| te: 2007 | MIX Global 10 | 00 based on data from MIX Marke ne end of this report. | | r 3, 2007."n/a ⁿ means that rankings are not av | nailable forthat year. |
| te: 2007 | MIX Global 10 | 00 based on data from MIX Marke he end of this report. Top 10 | | r 3,2007."n/ə" meansthat rankingsare not av (Average) | nailable forthat year. 0.5 |
| te: 2007 | MIX Global 10 | 00 based on data from MIX Marke he end of this report. Top 10 Top 25 | | r 3,2007."n/d" meansthat rankingsare not av (Awerage) (Awerage) | vailable forthat year. 0.5 0.6 |

| Rank | Rank (05) | MFIName | Country | Borrowers/Staff Member (ni |
|-----------|--|--|--|----------------------------|
| 1 | 1 | Banco Popular do Brasil | Brazil | 7,20 |
| 2 | 5 | BFL | India | 1,40 |
| 3 | 4 | Sanghamithra | lndia | 1,3 |
| 4 | 30 | CVECA Kita/Bafoulabé | Mali | 1,2 |
| 5 | 7 | EKPA | Russia | 7 |
| 6 | 10 | VBSP | Vietnam | 7 |
| 7 | 21 | Anisha Microfin | India | 7 |
| 8 | n/a | RaDB | Sri Lanka | 6 |
| 9 | n/a | BWDC | India | 6 |
| 10 | 27 | KRUSHI | India | 6 |
| | IX Global 100 based railable at the end of | on data from MIX Market available on December 3, 2 this report. | 007."n/a" means that ranking sare not availa | ible forthat year. |
| | raila ble at the end of | this report. | | |
| | raila ble at the end of | this report. | (kverage) | 1,526 |
| | raila ble at the end of | this report. 0 5 | (Average) (Average) | 1,526 866 |
| | railable at the end of Top 1 Top 1 Top 2 Top 2 | this report. 0 5 0 | (Average) (Average) (Average) | 1,526 866 586 |
| rankingsa | raila ble at the end of | this report. 0 5 0 0 | (Average) (Average) | 1,526 866 |



MF Banana Skin 2008

With the notable exception of Africa, the perception is that a shortage of funding is not a problem for the microfinance industry at the present time. Indeed, too much capital is probably a bigger problem than too little in that it may drive standards down.

http://cgap.org/portal/binary/com.epicentric.contentmanagement.servlet.ContentDeliveryServlet/Documents/MF_BananaSkins2008.pdf



MF Banana Skin 2008

The two biggest problems identified by respondents appear to be growing competition as new players enter the industry, and management quality/corporate governance. Complaints about competition may just be special pleading by incumbents; management skills are obviously in short supply in most of the countries where microfinance can play a role.




MF Banana Skin 2008

Government often does not help. It is widely felt that regulation is frequently inappropriate, and incentives can be perverse. There can also be (surprise) political interference.



MF Banana Skin 2008

There appears to be a temptation towards 'mission drift'. We noticed this a decade ago, when it seemed that half the microfinanciers in the world really wanted to be full-service bankers. Now, many of them seem to be shifting from serving the poor to flogging high interest rate consumer finance products. The profits may be more attractive, but the mission has changed – with a potentially adverse reputational impact.





MENA in the MIX appreciation

- Very favorable environments for growth
- Low market penetration rates
- low inflation
- generally stable economies


MENA in the MIX appreciation


- peak of the youth of the industry
- unshackled by competition and high financing costs, hallmarks of more mature sectors.
- Arab microfinance institutions face lower hurdles than their global peers and can more easily attain profits, all while responding to the needs of the lower segment of the microfinance market.
- The Moroccan sector continues to lead in outreach, but Egyptian institutions are fast on their peers' heels and are showing new signs of growth


http://www.mixmbb.org/Publications/002-REG/MIDDLE%20EAST%20AND%20NORTH%20AFRICA%20(MENA)/ MIX_2005_Arab_Benchmarking_Report_EN.pdf


| ofinance Information eXchange | | | ance Ind | | | | |
|---|-------|-------|-----------------|------|---------|--------|-----------|
| | EAP | EECA | February LAC | MENA | S. Asia | Africa | All Regio |
| Outreach | | | | | | | _ |
| # of MEIs | 131 | 202 | 272 | 41 | 202 | 190 | 1.038 |
| # of Borrowers (millions) | 10.5 | 1.8 | 9.3 | 1.7 | 29.8 | 4.8 | 57.9 |
| # of Voluntary Savers (millions) | 32.3 | 2.7 | 6.9 | 0.0 | 18.6 | 7.2 | 67.7 |
| Depth of Outreach | | | | | | | |
| Avg. Loan Balance per Borrower (\$) | 534 | 2,581 | 1,126 | 520 | 137 | 617 | 1,031 |
| Avg. Loan Balance per Borrower (% of GNI per Capita} | 44 | 162 | 51 | 30 | 27 | 153 | 85 |
| Balance Sheet | | | | | | | |
| Gross Loan Portfolio (million \$) | 4,786 | 4,912 | 9,924 | 641 | 2,613 | 1,553 | 24,429 |
| Voluntary Savings (million \$) | 5,217 | 2,257 | 6,656 | 0 | 453 | 1,477 | 16,062 |
| Assets (million \$) | 7,597 | 7,144 | 12,718 | 734 | 3,495 | 2,944 | 34,632 |
| Equity (million \$) | 813 | 1,102 | 2,144 | 317 | 672 | 686 | 5,736 |


| Efficiency | | | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|------|------|-------|-------|------|------|--------------------|
| Operating Expense | | | | | | | |
| (% Avg. Gross Loan Portfolio) | 28 | 21 | 30 | 23 | 22 | 44 | 29 |
| Cost per Borrower (\$) | 79 | 444 | 183 | 100 | 31 | 145 | 183 |
| Cost per Borrower | | | | | | | |
| (% GNI per Capita) | 7 | 28 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 40 | 18 |
| Profitability % | | | | | | | |
| ROA – avg. | -1.1 | 2.8 | 0.6 | -1.9 | -3.5 | -6.5 | -1.4 |
| ROA – median | 1.4 | 2.7 | 2.0 | 0.5 | 0.4 | -1.8 | 1.1 |
| ROE – avg. | -5.0 | 1.0 | -36.0 | -62.0 | 37.0 | 8.0 | -4.0 |
| ROE – median | 6.0 | 8.0 | 8.0 | 1.0 | 7.0 | -5.0 | 5.0 |
| Portfolio Quality | | | | | | | |
| PAR 30 | | | | | | | |
| (% of Avg. Gross Loan Portfolio) | 7.1 | 3.2 | 5.8 | 7.6 | 3.8 | 9.4 | 5.7 |
| Write-Off Ratio | | | | | | | |
| (% of Avg. Gross Loan Portfolio) | 3.3 | 1.6 | 2.9 | 2.7 | 1.7 | 5.2 | 2.8 |
| | | | | | | | |
| Annual Growth Rates (%) | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | Compour Average |
| # of Borrowers | 14.0 | 11.1 | 16.3 | 21.3 | 26.9 | 22.7 | 18.6 |
| Gross Loan Portfolio (\$) | 25.4 | 51.0 | 51.1 | 121.2 | 42.7 | 46.5 | 53.8 |




















| Arab | | | | | |
|--|---|---|--|---|---|
| | Arab MFIs | Egypt | Могоссо | Arab MFIs (excl. Morocco) | Arab FSS |
| INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTIC S | | | | | |
| Number of MFIs | 23 | 6 | 7 | 16 | 15 |
| Age Total Assets Offices | 7 6,993,610 13 | 7.5 9,879,752 9 | 8 12,237,425 54 | 7 6,835,365 10 | 8 6,677,120 13 |
| Personnel | 80 | 321 | 237 | 77 | 80 |
| FINANCIAL STRUCTURE Capital / Asset Ratio Commercial Funding Liabilities Ratio Debr/ Equity Ratio Deposits to Loans Deposits to Total Asset Storss Loan Portfolio/Total Assets | 68.4% 24.2% 0.5 0 75.0% | 59.7% 80.8% 0.7 0 0 42.5% | 33.6% 43.0% 20 0 83.7% | 72.5% 126% 04 0 0 606% | 53.1% 24.2% 0.9 0 0 80.2% |
| SCALE AND OUTREACH | | | | | |
| Number of Active Borrowers Percent of Women Borrowers Number of Loans Outstanding Gross Loan Pontfolio Average Loan Bahnce per Borrower Average Loan Bahnce per Borrower/GNI per capita Average Outstanding Bahnce | 12,935 66.0% 12,935 5,586,641 248 15.1% 246 | 32,600 65.8% 32,600 3,730,567 136 10.4% 136 | 43,897 66,6% 44,297 10,876,254 197 13,0% 197 | 11,962 65,9% 11,962 5,404,729 272 15,5% 259 | 12,935 66.6% 12,935 5,586,641 248 13.7% 246 |
| Averaĝe Outstanding Balance/ GNI per capita Number of Voluntary Savers Number of Voluntary Savings Accounts Voluntary Savings | 15.1% 0 0 | 10.4% 0 0 0 | 13.0% 0 0 0 | 15.5% 0 0 | 13.0% 0 0 0 |
| Average Savings Balance per Saver Average Savings Account Balance | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 | 0 0 |
| | | | | | |

| Kizofiance Wometon o.Charge | | | | |
|---|---------|------------------------|-----------|-----------------------|
| MIX Global | 100: Co | mposite - | Highlig | hts |
| Fast growth, Top 25 M | | MFI Name | Country | Overall Percentile |
| adding 75% more clien 2006 | 1 | Zakoura | Morocco | 84.37% |
| | . 2 | Sabaragamuwa | Sri Lanka | 83.96% |
| Low transactions cos Top 10 paying 3.7% pe | | AlAmana | Morocco | 83.38% |
| borrower relative to GN | | GV | India | 82.93% |
| Subsequent tiers (Top | 100, 5 | ProCredit Bank Serbia | Serbia | 82.43% |
| 500) double previous. | 6 | Bandhan | India | 81.14% |
| Strong credit risk | 7 | Sarvodaya Nano Finance | India | 80.12% |
| management, Top 100 |) 8 | ESAF | India | 80.04% |
| experiencing half the | 9 | Credi Fe | Ecuador | 79.85% |
| delinquency (2.1% vs 2 and write downs (0.6% 1.2%) of Top 500 | | JMCC | Jordan | 79.59% |
| | | | | miX |









Conclusion / défis MF - MENA

- Management
- Governance
- Supervision
- Competition
- Social commitment
- Industry's efficiency
- Modesty